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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of the continuing trend in the U.S. Airline 
industry away from hub-and-spoke (network) airlines and toward low-cost airlines. The model of 
this study examines the level of success which the network carriers may experience by using 
market segmentation and price discrimination to sustain profitability in the face of the growth in 
market share held by low-cost carrier airlines.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
he purpose of this study is to explain how and why the major air carriers practiced price 
discrimination in the U.S airline industry after deregulation, even though there was a threat of entry 
and underpricing by low-cost carriers. Since effective competition in the industry is between all 
airlines flying between a pair of cities, a city-pair fare comparison is helpful in illustrating price dispersion among 
carriers. Airline fare structures are complex and include a broad variety of prices. Although the degree of price 
discrimination has been extensive, major carriers and regional carriers have continued to practice it since airline 
deregulation was completed in 1985. One of the major consequences of deregulation was the discontinuation of 
direct flights to many smaller markets. This in turn caused the development of a “hub-and-spoke” system. Smaller 
markets began to be served by commuter-type flights to connecting flights in major hubs. The major carriers’ plan 
was to use these possibly unprofitable flights from the “spokes” to bring passengers to profitable connecting flights. 
Their thinking was that this would ensure customer loyalty, thus raising an effective barrier to entry into major 
markets. But the hub-and-spoke system did not prove to be an effective entry barrier. Low-cost carriers were able to 
achieve economies of scale by “skimming the cream” from denser routes using fewer aircraft models and offering 
fewer amenities to passengers. As long as the low-cost carriers had a relatively small market share, they were not a 
threat to the hub-and-spoke system maintained by the majors. But the hub-and-spoke system’s higher costs became 
increasingly difficult to support as the market share enjoyed by the low-cost carriers rose. Clearly the market has 
shifted towards low-cost, low-fare airlines, and this trend is further enhanced by a decrease in the number of 
business travelers and other high-paying customers. There has also been a shift in demand by pleasure travelers, 
many of whom are now willing to drive two or three hours to smaller or less convenient airports to fly low-fare 
airlines.   
 
Since 1985, U.S. airlines have had their choice of which routes to fly and what fares to charge. Immediately 
after 1985, the traditional network carriers were somewhat at a loss, given their long-standing culture of protected 
routes and fares far exceeding marginal and average costs. Their high-fixed-cost culture required that they fly full, or 
almost full, planes to survive. At that point, product differentiation strategies became more important than ever. 
These firms began to segment themselves into "service oriented" and "price driven" divisions in an attempt to 
increase load factors. Post-deregulation hub-and-spoke airlines have worked to enhance their ability to discriminate 
on price by creating complex restrictions that force passengers into categories. This resulted in a baffling mix of 
restrictions which included non-refundable fares, requiring some flights to be booked two or more weeks in 
advance, and requiring Saturday night stayovers on round-trip flights. This allowed passengers to be segmented into 
two basic groups: business travelers, and pleasure travelers. Thus the framework was set for discriminating among 
passengers with low demand elasticity (business travel) and those with a high demand elasticity (pleasure travel). 
T 
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Offering discounted fares to passengers with a high price elasticity of demand can sharply increase load factors. 
Maximizing revenues for a given flight is a challenging and complex task, but by changing ticket prices as the time 
for departure of the flight approaches, the airlines can achieve higher revenues than with static pricing. Another 
device that boosts revenues is that of allowing “standby” passengers, as the marginal cost of placing a passenger in 
an otherwise empty seat is low compared to the additional revenue generated by them. 
 
Discriminatory pricing practices have long been criticized as unfair (Dirlam and Kahn 1952). But only a 
small fraction of airline passengers is truly negatively affected by price discrimination. Before deregulation a 
majority of passengers purchased “coach” fares, which were only slightly discounted. The inroads made by low-cost 
carriers forced the major carriers into some substantial policy changes. Delta Airlines completely restructured its 
fares and related policies in January 2005. These changes included 6,000 discount programs for corporate groups, 
sharp reductions in the availability of “walk-up” fares, and discontinuation of “Saturday night stayover” 
requirements. In those city pairs where they competed directly with Delta, United, Northwest, US Airways and 
Continental implemented changes to match Delta. American Airlines did not directly match Delta, but made many 
fare changes and matched Delta to some extent. This type of behavior illustrates the mutual interdependency that 
exists in oligopoly, especially in this “tight” oligopoly where 3 or 4 carriers fly very similar schedules between the 
same city pairs.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Dana (1998) attempted to explain the role of advance purchase discounts as a means of reducing the 
uncertainty of consumer demand in the airline industry. These discounts for low-valuation customers could perhaps 
reduce this uncertainty. However, Dana noted that his results could not be obtained by firms which possessed market 
power, and his model assumed that firms have no market power. He also noted that his model could not successfully 
explain practices such as “Saturday-night stayover” and other round-trip requirements. 
 
Hayes and Ross (1998) used a price dispersion model to attempt to distinguish between price dispersion 
and price discrimination. Their strong findings were that significant differences existed between price discrimination 
and price dispersion among airlines in the early 1990s. Most price dispersion, they found, was associated with peak 
load pricing schemes and “fare wars,” rather than price discrimination. 
 
Stavins’ (2001) findings were that the level of price discrimination decreases with market concentration. 
Following the traditional view, Stavins asserted that price discrimination should not be practiced in perfect 
competition. In additions, she stressed that price discrimination can be expected to increase with market 
concentration. Other studies, such as Giamue and Guillou (2003), support Stavins’ findings.  Giamue and Guillou 
found a positive correlation between market concentration and price discrimination in European airline markets.  
 
Aydin (2008) focused on the notion that price discrimination alone is not evidence of market power. 
Therefore the existence of price discrimination in the industry should not be used to justify interventions by 
regulatory institutions. 
 
MODEL AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 This study uses the basic model built by Aydin (2008) and assumes a quasi-perfectly competitive 
environment where consumers have perfect information and firms have identical cost structures and produce 
identical services. Along with the incumbent, entrants can seize the opportunity if there is a need for an extra flight 
on a route. Free entry and exit is assumed for any route, and the number of daily flights is determined simply by the 
ratio of demand to the efficient size of aircraft (hence the number of firms will be related to this ratio). 
  
It is also assumed that total market demand is constant in the short run. It may be useful to explain the 
competitive conditions in the airline industry, since the short run capacity condition is quite similar in this model to 
that particular industry. Airlines mostly announce their schedules before the beginning of each period and the 
schedules are somewhat inflexible, although individual airlines may try to increase flexibility for their own 
passengers through code sharing and other similar arrangements among airlines. 
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Firms are assumed to be able to recognize differences in consumers’ preferences. There are three different 
groups of consumers in the market: H (high demanders such as business travelers), M (regulars) or L (low 
demanders such as pleasure travelers). Moreover, the firms can prevent reselling, through restrictions on the tickets.  
For simplicity, roundtrip travel and other complexities of the real world airline industry are ignored. Utility 
functions of these groups are given as 
 
pdU
pU
psU
L
M
H



)(
)(



 
 
where  is basic utility of a flight for all the consumers, “s” is additional utility from avoiding a required “Saturday 
night stay” and all other undesirable restrictions of a cheaper ticket while, “d” is the utility loss due to a required 
“Saturday night stayover”, advance purchase requirements, the nonrefundable feature, or other restrictions imposed 
on low price tickets. I assume that customer distribution will be equal between two firms when they offer identical 
service at the same price. Each consumer buys only one unit provided that her 0U ; otherwise (if 0U  ) she 
will not buy any unit. 
 
Marginal Cost is zero and Total Cost is a function not of the number of passengers but of the number of 
daily flights. Therefore, the cost function is 
 
TC  = CC  + SC  
 
where CC  is common (this may be or may not be sunk) fixed cost per day,   is the number of flights per day in the 
route by the firm, and  SC  is avoidable fixed cost per flight (for now also a separate fixed cost). Any airline has two 
options: (1) uniform pricing by charging an average price that maximizes its profit, or (2) perfect price 
discrimination by charging )( s  to business travelers, )(  to regular passengers, and )( d to pleasure 
travelers. If we specify the following conditions in the market, when fixed costs are large enough to limit survival: 
 
0)(  SC CCNd  (1) 
 
0)(  SCMH CCnn                                            (2) 
 
 Suppose there are two major cities; city A and city B. City A is a hub for firm 1 and city B is a hub for firm 
2 (Figure 1). Aydin (2008) suggests that common cost recovery may force network airlines to charge discriminatory 
prices to collect as much as revenue as possible while increasing their load factors, especially in their spoke 
connections. How will competing network airlines react in terms of pricing strategy if we introduce a new non-
network airline that is only interested in serving passengers between A and B? The new airline has lower cost and 
price, because it does not have any common cost. 
 
    
Figure 1 
A B 
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Suppose the non-network airline charges a uniform price because it aims to increase its load factor only 
between A and B. Following the assumptions (1) and (2), the new airline will charge dp    to attract every 
potential customer in the market. Condition (1) imposes that this low price would not generate enough revenue to 
cover the cost of a network carrier, but may generate enough revenue for the low-cost entrant to cover its cost. This 
could be due to lower total cost in the absence of common cost. 
  
Now we have network carriers that bring connections and convenience to their customers and one low-cost 
carrier that can serve at a discounted price and can attract price-driven passengers. Some portion of the passengers in 
each group will still prefer the network carriers, because they need to make some connection on the spokes. The rest 
(in this setup basically the people who are flying only between A and B) will be or may be indifferent among them. 
It is worth noting that network carriers can still be discriminatory at least among their loyal passengers from the 
medium and high willing to pay groups. That was the case in the U.S market until January 2005 when Delta broke 
down this structure.  
 
Initially it is assumed that there is one incumbent network carrier that discriminates and one entrant that is 
offering discounted service between A and B only. Obviously, a new firm is not a perfect substitute for the network 
carrier and it can attract only a fraction of passengers from the incumbent’s spectrum. The fraction of “loyal” 
passengers of the network airlines is the key here to find the profit maximizing pricing strategy for the network 
carrier. The proportions of each type of passenger who will be loyal to the network carrier are denoted by  MH  ,  
and L . Suppose that the total demand is initially equal to N  where LMH nnnN   and LMH nnn  .  
 
As it is stated above, the major difference of this paper from Aydin (2008) is that some fraction of each 
passenger type will fly with the network carrier regardless. That is, there are loyal passengers as follows: 
 
HH n  : Number of loyal passengers in the high group  
MM n  : Number of loyal passengers in the medium group 
LLn    : Number of loyal passengers in the low group 
 
 The low-cost carrier already charges the discounted price, which is dp   . The decision here will be 
made by network carrier, which has two options; (1) continue to discriminate at least among the loyal passengers 
and share the low end pleasure travelers with the low-cost carrier or (2) match the fare of the discount airline. This 
study assumes that there is no capacity constraint to avoid complexity. The profit level for the network carrier can be 
calculated under both situations as it is shown below. 
 
Profit under discrimination: 
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Profit under uniform pricing: 
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The network carrier will choose discrimination if 
UD    and use uniform pricing otherwise. The inequality 
UD    holds only if 
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The sum of the last three parts of the inequality is always positive. Hence, whether the inequality holds 
depends on the values of H  and M . If they are bigger than or equal to 0.5, then the network carrier will 
discriminate even at the presence of low-cost carrier. But if 
H  and M  have low values, in other words if the 
network airline has very few loyal customers, the network carrier may chose to charge a uniform price.  
 
Solving the same situation when two network carriers and one low-cost carrier are present gives us the 
following condition, which is very similar to (5). Condition (5) suggests that the more the network carriers in the 
route the more likely that the low-cost carrier will force them to drop discrimination. Solving (3) and (4) with three 
firms reveals that 
UD    condition holds only if  
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 In a simulation created in the computer, we have found conforming results supporting our hypothesis that 
as the proportion of loyal customers for network carriers decreases the market will be less suitable for 
discrimination. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 Since deregulation, the airline industry could be considered a contestable market, although perhaps not 
perfectly contestable (Baumol 1982). Although point-to-point and hub-and-spoke airlines have used price 
discrimination since the early 1980s, its use is less extensive among point-to-point airlines. At the same time, the 
low rate of return on capital experienced by major network airlines is an established fact. The networks earn normal, 
or slightly below normal, profits. This raises the question as to why price discrimination persists in the industry, 
given its contestability conditions and wide differences in structure between the network and low-cost carriers. 
 
 The findings of this study support the notion that firms can effectively use price discrimination in situations 
where they have no control over entry, but can effectively channel consumers into market segments. Price 
discrimination can then be used to cover the carriers’ common and separate costs. This result mainly depends on the 
magnitudes of s, which is consumers’ additional utility from avoiding undesired restrictions on reduced-fare tickets, 
and d, consumers’ utility loss from undesired restrictions on reduced-fare tickets, and the ratio of well-defined 
categories of business travelers to pleasure travelers.  
 
 From a game-theoretic perspective, it is possible that price discrimination is the result of Nash equilibrium 
among the network carriers. However, this may have changed recently due to increasing competition from uniform-
pricing, low-cost airlines that have taken market share from the majors.   
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